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The nature of macroeconomics
￿ William Poole:
￿ At the start (1998):
￿ “Macroeconomics is normal times punctuated by
adjustment to shocks.”
￿ At the end (2008):
￿ “Macroeconomics is adjustment to shocks punctuated by
normal times.”
￿ Lesson: Adjustment is everything.
￿ Macroeconomy may be vulnerable to “big ticket losses”
during adjustment.
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Sources of model uncertainty
￿ We cannot write the “full” macroeconomic model down
and study it.
￿ Much is missing in any analysis.
￿ We understand this.
￿ In studying simpler models, we encounter lots of
complications.
￿ We infer that large models must have a lot of unanalyzed
complications.
￿ Result: We do not trust large models.
￿ Result: We are uncertain about the correct model of the
macroeconomy.
￿ How can we cope with these doubts?
￿ In particular: Since the models are about people, are our
doubts also their doubts?
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Backrooms and frontrooms
￿ Sargent’s amusing description of academia (backroom) vs
policymakers (frontroom).
￿ Caricature of the backroom versus the frontroom:
￿ Backroom: States and parameters are known by all, and
policy is menacingly complicated.
￿ Frontroom: States and parameters are known by none, but
policy itself is easy.
￿ Backroom: Stationarity assumptions commonplace, but
data are often untrusted.
￿ Frontroom: Stationarity considered unlikely, but thirst for
data is unquenchable.
￿ Implication: The focus in the policy world is on
determining the state of the system by looking at lots of
data.
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Sargent meets the Romers
￿ A forecasting exercise comparing FOMC to staff forecasts.
￿ Important to stress that forecasts are made "under
appropriate policy."
￿ FOMC has wrestled with this issue for a long time.
￿ Staff forecasts sometimes made under "constant interest
rate" projections, thought to be a "no policy change”
benchmark.
￿ Sargent correct to stress speciﬁcation doubts, driven by
large model distrust described above.
￿ Also due to titles like "Making Macro Models Behave
Reasonably"?
￿ It would be the Romer’s pure forecast exercise if we take
the Prescott view.
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Information ﬂows
￿ Eric Leeper: information ﬂow assumptions and realities
affect interpretations of empirical work on the effects of
ﬁscal policy changes.
￿ Related to Beaudry and Portier concerning the timing of
information and changes in beliefs.
￿ These strike me as big ideas.
￿ Those that follow monetary policy in the U.S. understand
when an old expected interest rate path is discarded and
replaced with a new expected interest rate path.
￿ Perhaps because of a key piece of data.
￿ Or because of an ofﬁcial statement.
￿ The entire path changes.
￿ Related work by Hamilton.
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More stability analysis
￿ I would prefer to see more stability analysis than I did at
this conference.
￿ Stability is more important than you think as a policy goal.
￿ Policymakers should strive ﬁrst to avoid the big ticket
losses associated with indeterminacy and expectational
instability.
￿ In the recent ﬁnancial crisis ...
￿ ... the threat might be best described as the possibility of a
transition to a steady state with a low level of ﬁnancial
intermediation services.
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Learning
￿ “Recursive least squares” just one in a family of recursive
algorithms.
￿ New Bayesian interpretations exist of the standard
recursive learning exercise.
￿ See Bullard and Suda (2008).
￿ Idea: Suppose the forecasting community is Bayesian
instead of classical.
￿ Standard analysis goes through, but with an additional
term in the actual law of motion.
￿ E-stability conditions are unchanged.
￿ Even Bayesian learning implies some type of expectational
stability condition.
￿ Careful readers of Woodford’s paper at this conference
would see expectational stability in play there as well.
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￿ E-stability conditions are unchanged.
￿ Even Bayesian learning implies some type of expectational
stability condition.
￿ Careful readers of Woodford’s paper at this conference
would see expectational stability in play there as well.
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Learning and robustness
￿ A thought about robustness: Agents could “learn not to be
so pessimistic.”
￿ But consider Cogley and Sargent (2007) concerning the
equity premium.
￿ Mehra-Prescott.
￿ Twisted beliefs of Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark are brought on
by the Great Depression.
￿ Agents are Bayesian learners with respect to the
probabilities of states.
￿ Bad state is rarely visited, so that pessimism remains
inﬂuential for decades.
￿ The equity premium is large and declines only very slowly
to the “true” value of zero.
￿ The 1970s as a similar beliefs-twisting event?
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Fitting the data
￿ Professor Sims spoke eloquently about model ﬁt versus the
interpretability of DSGE models.
￿ Good model ﬁt is often taken as absolutely essential in the
“frontroom.” But not necessarily in the backroom:
￿ Kocherlakota (2007, FRB-St. Louis Review).
￿ Argues by example that a better-ﬁtting model can give a
worse answer to a substantive policy question.
￿ What we want is the answer to the policy question.
￿ I see the recent literature described by Sims as an attempt
to reach an intelligent compromise in this area.
￿ The ﬁt to data gives us conﬁdence that we are on the right
track with our economic concepts.
￿ But we do not want to push so hard in getting a good ﬁt
that we lose our economic grounding altogether.
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An excellent conference
￿ Thanks to Governor Lee and the Bank of Korea staff.
￿ This has been an excellent conference on critical topics at
the research frontier of macroeconomics.
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